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Abstract 
This paper examines key developments in the field of European border surveillance in the Mediterranean. By asking, 
‘Whose Mare?’, we focus on rule of law challenges stemming from these developments in a post-Lisbon EU. The 
developments examined are the Italian Navy-led Mare Nostrum operation, the debates over European ‘exit 
strategies’ for this operation and the ensuing launch of the Frontex Triton joint operation (JO). The recently adopted 
Regulation on Frontex sea border surveillance operations is also presented as a key development to understand the 
rule of law challenges. Moreover, the adoption of the European Union Maritime Security Strategy (MSS) and the 
development of several maritime surveillance systems in the EU highlight that a wide range of actors seeks authority 
over this field.  
Although the home affairs-driven and Schengen-based cooperation in this field was initially developed in informal 
‘clubs’, it has gradually been institutionalised and formalised in rules, competences and mandates. This cooperation 
is now subject to more – although still incomplete – rule of law frameworks and the involvement of the Union 
legislation and the Court of Justice. Moreover, it is built on a civilian law enforcement basis, thereby excluding other 
policy-making communities from the field of mobility surveillance. This paper argues that the adoption of the MSS 
signals a renewed attempt by the defence, foreign and maritime affairs policy-making communities to seek authority 
over this field. We understand this as a result of the ‘politics of de-pillarisation’ in a post-Lisbon EU. 
This paper presents several emerging rule of law challenges as authority over this field is often sought outside EU 
rule of law frameworks. As a result, the possibilities for public, parliamentary and judicial scrutiny are limited, 
thereby hampering the taking of responsibility for persons seeking international protection. This risks taking this 
field back to the days of the ‘laboratory’ and ‘experimental governance’ approaches to policy-making. The 
recommendations therefore highlight the need for more accountability, suggesting, inter alia, that the European 
Court of Auditors assesses the ‘dual use’ funding behind the MSS and that an EU Border Monitor is established  
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Whose Mare? 
Rule of law challenges in the field of  
European border surveillance in the Mediterranean 
Sergio Carrera and Leonhard den Hertog 
CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe No. 79 / January 2015 
Introduction 
The field of European border surveillance in the Mediterranean has experienced a recent multiplication of 
legal, policy and operational developments. We have witnessed the launch of the Italian Navy Mare Nostrum1 
operation after headline-grabbing cases of deaths at sea in the Mediterranean as well as the search for EU ‘exit 
strategies’ for the operation, finally resulting in the Frontex (EU Border Agency) Triton joint operation (JO). 
In the background of these developments, the negotiation process and adoption of a new Regulation 656/2014 
covering Frontex sea border surveillance operations has constituted a major step for establishing common EU 
rules on maritime surveillance of human mobility, and most centrally on search and rescue (SAR) at sea and 
the disembarkation of persons. At the EU policy formulation level, the adoption of the EU Maritime Security 
Strategy and its Action Plan under the auspices of the Italian presidency during the second half of 2014 has 
brought to light a growing number of EU and national actors entering the field of maritime border surveillance. 
This is also reflected in the proliferation of different surveillance systems and technologies now operational or 
under development, such as the European border surveillance system EUROSUR, the maritime surveillance 
project MARSUR and the development of a Common Intelligence Sharing Environment (CISE). These 
developments add to the complexity of the field of European surveillance in the Mediterranean and provoke 
questions about ‘who’ does ‘what’ ‘where’ on what basis and under which rule of law framework.  
By asking, ‘Whose Mare?’, this paper aims at gaining a better understanding of the ways in which these legal, 
policy and operational developments can be understood in a post-Lisbon Treaty EU arena. It does so by 
examining how the actors and security professionals behind these developments are attempting to gain 
authority over the field of European border surveillance in the Mediterranean, and how they do so inside and 
outside the post-Lisbon Treaty rule of law frameworks. While previous research has already examined the 
merging between civilian/border and military authorities in border surveillance and the management of 
migration in the EU,2 as well as the tensions between interior and foreign affair professionals in the 
                                                     
 Dr Sergio Carrera is Senior Research Fellow and Head of the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Unit of the Centre for 
European Policy Studies (CEPS) in Brussels. Dr Leonhard den Hertog is a researcher within the same Unit. The authors 
would like to thank Prof. Elspeth Guild, Prof. Didier Bigo, Dr Peter Hobbing, Dr Tineke Strik (Member of the 
Parliamentary Assembly, Council of Europe) and Dr Nikolaos Sitaropoulos (Deputy to the Director of the Office, 
Commissioner for Human Rights, Council of Europe) for their valuable comments on a previous draft of this paper. Our 
research builds on the methods of data generation from policy documents, parliamentary hearings and press reports as 
well as carrying out legal analysis and several semi-structured interviews with professionals at key institutions in this 
field. Interviews were held at the Commission Directorate-Generals (DGs) Home Affairs and Maritime Affairs, the 
European External Action Service (EEAS), the Brussels Liaison Office of the EU Border Agency Frontex (The European 
Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European 
Union) and at the European Defence Agency (EDA). We would like to thank all our interviewees for their valuable time 
and insights 
1 “Mare Nostrum” is Latin for “Our Sea”. The Romans already called the Mediterranean Sea by this name. It became 
more controversial, however, after it was also used by the fascist Mussolini government to push for a sphere of Italian 
influence in the Mediterranean Sea. 
2 See for instance D. Bigo (2014), “The (in)securitisation practices of the three universes of EU border control: 
military/navy – border guards/police – database analysts’, Security Dialogue, Vol. 45, No. 3, pp. 210, 220. 
2  CARRERA & DEN HERTOG 
Europeanization of migration policy,3 this paper argues that the institutional configurations which have 
emerged since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 have changed this field in at least two ways: 
First, by making more transparent some of these old struggles between these security actors; and second, by 
bringing more into the spotlight foreign affairs and military professionals at domestic and EU levels as a result 
of the setting up of the European External Action Service (EEAS), the consolidation of the European Defence 
Agency (EDA) and experimental or ‘flexible’ negotiation venues inside the Council such as the ad hoc, 
informal and cross-sector Council working group called the Friends of the Presidency (FoP) Group. These 
actors are using the scrapping of the First, Second and Third Pillar divide resulting from the Treaty of Lisbon4 
– the politics of de-pillarisation – as a tool to gain legitimacy and authority in the setting of priorities, financial 
resources and surveillance technologies deployed in the field of maritime surveillance of human mobility.  
While several have already engaged in positioning themselves in these struggles, by calling for the further 
involvement of military capabilities in the Mediterranean,5 in this paper we instead argue that these authority 
struggles actually pose a series of profound rule of law and ethical challenges which should be openly debated 
and taken into consideration in any future EU policy debates regarding border and migration management in 
the Mediterranean. We understand ‘rule of law challenges’ here as attempts to evade EU rule of law and 
supranational accountability frameworks, thereby enabling 1) the shifting of responsibilities for the individuals 
targeted by these developments, who are often persons seeking international protection or at distress at sea, 
and 2) the lack of democratic accountability of the involved decision-shaping and decision-making processes. 
The focus of the analysis is thus on the authority struggles and rule of law challenges and their 
interrelationships in this policy field.   
Section 1 of the paper starts by outlining key policy, legal and operational developments in the field of 
European border surveillance in the Mediterranean. Throughout the discussions of these developments, we 
bring to the forefront the different yet interrelated struggles by actors to seek authority over this field and the 
rule of law challenges that mark or drive these activities. To provide a better understanding of the broader 
tendencies characterising this field, section 2 presents the cross-cutting elements of the developments discussed 
in Section 1, thereby identifying authority struggles between actors and alliances from different policy-making 
communities as well as challenges over whether their activities fall inside or outside EU rule of law 
frameworks. We furthermore present our understanding of why these actors and approaches could come to the 
forefront in a post-Lisbon EU and highlight their attempts at evading EU rule of law frameworks. These two 
key elements – authority struggles and rule of law challenges – are presented in the conclusion (section 3) as 
interlinked drivers behind the developments in the field of European surveillance in the Mediterranean, 
resulting in increasing divergences between the rule of law and authority in EU maritime border surveillance-
related policies. This challenges central rule of law principles and regulations governing the responsibility for 
‘who’ does ‘what’ ‘where’ in EU border, asylum and migration policies. The recommendations laid down in 
Section 4 address some of the rule of law deficits marking this field.  
                                                     
3 V. Guiraudon (2000), “European integration and migration policy: vertical policy making as venue shopping”, Journal 
of Common Market Studies, Vol. 38, No. 2, pp. 251-271; S. Carrera, L. den Hertog and J. Parkin (2012), “What prospects 
for EU-Southern Mediterranean relations?”, MEDPRO Technical Report, No. 15, August. 
4 The Lisbon Treaty abolished the ‘three pillar’ structure that had been introduced by the Maastricht Treaty and that 
consisted, after the Treaty of Amsterdam, of the ‘first’ Community pillar (the former Treaty establishing the European 
Community), the ‘second’ pillar for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP – former Title V of the Treaty on the 
EU) and the ‘third’ pillar for Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters (PJCC – former title VI of the Treaty 
on the EU). However, CFSP is still covered by its distinct set of rules stipulated in Title V of the current Treaty on the 
EU, whereas other policy fields are now covered by the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU. 
5 Cf., R. Parkes (2014), “Integrating EU defence and migration policies in the Mediterranean”, FRIDE Working Papers, 
No. 125, November; H. Brady (2014), “Mare Europaeum? Tackling Mediterranean migration”, European Union Institute 
for Security Studies Brief, No. 25, September; M. Drent, K. Homan, D. Zandee (2013), “Civil-military capacities for 
European Security”, Clingendael Report, December. 
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1. Recent developments: a field of authority struggles and rule of law challenges  
The field of European surveillance in the Mediterranean is experiencing a proliferation of initiatives and 
strategies. This section presents an overview of these various developments and their interrelationships. From 
October 2013 till October 2014, the Italian Navy-led Mare Nostrum operation was fully operational (section 
1.1) and European ‘exit strategies’ for it fiercely discussed at Italian and EU levels, eventually leading to the 
launching of the Frontex Triton JO in November 2014 (section 1.2). The negotiation dynamics and final 
adoption in May 2014 of the new Regulation on Frontex sea border surveillance operations, including SAR 
and disembarkation, should be understood as a crucial driver and outcome of the processes that shape this field 
(section 1.3). The adoption of the MSS in June 2014, driven by the defence, foreign affairs and maritime affairs 
policy-making communities, can also be seen as being in dialogue with these developments (section 1.4). 
Finally, the authority struggles over the surveillance of maritime mobility present themselves visibly when 
analysing the multiplication of EU-driven and -financed surveillance systems as initiated by different 
communities of policy-makers (section 1.5). 
1.1 The Mare Nostrum operation  
The Mare Nostrum operation was launched on 18 October 2013 by the Italian Navy, following headline-
grabbing cases of deaths at sea just off the Italian island of Lampedusa, in which more than 300 individuals 
lost their lives.6 This was not a completely new operation, but rather a serious upgrade of the ongoing naval 
operation “Constant Vigilance”.7 Initially, the idea was to establish a Frontex JO as a response to these 
tragedies. The former EU Home Affairs Commissioner Malmström suggested this by calling for “an extensive 
Frontex search and rescue operation that will cover the Mediterranean from Cyprus to Spain”,8 announcing 
that the member states should consider making available additional support for Frontex to carry out this 
operation.9 However, the Italian government went ahead with the Mare Nostrum mission. It became clear from 
interviews that Frontex and the Commission were largely unaware of the launch of Mare Nostrum, in what 
they consider a clear unilateral member state action.10  
There are diverging estimates of the overall operating costs of the Mare Nostrum operation, but according to 
some media sources they amount to about €9 million per month.11 Italy requested EU funding from the External 
Borders Fund (EBF) in November 2013, after which the Commission granted €1.8 million to Italy from the 
emergency support envelope under the EBF. This was supposed to cover one month of operating costs of the 
surveillance activities in the operation.12 After this financial support, the Commission did not grant further 
funding for the Mare Nostrum operation but did offer financial support to Italy for other purposes.13  
                                                     
6 BBC (2013), “Mediterranean ‘a cemetery’ – Maltese PM Muscat”, 12 October. Recently, in August 2014, around 300 
further deaths were reported in separate incidents off the Libyan coast, bringing the total death toll estimated by the 
UNHCR for 2014 to 2,000 individuals; see: Euronews (2014), “Drownings rise among migrants trying to reach Europe 
by sea”, 27 August. 
7 See: Italian Defence Ministry (2013), “Mare Nostrum Operation” (www.marina.difesa.it/EN/operations/Pagine/ 
MareNostrum.aspx). 
8 European Commission (2013), Commissioner Malmström’s intervention on Lampedusa during the Home Affairs 
Council press conference, MEMO, Luxembourg, 8 October.  
9 Times of Malta (2013), “Malmström proposes Med-wide search and rescue mission for migrant boats”, 8 October. 
10 Interview at the Commission, DG Home Affairs. 
11 Times of Malta (2013), “Malmström: Frontex cannot substitute Italy’s Mare Nostrum operation”, 9 July. The Mare 
Nostrum Operation cost Italy €114 million in total, and around €9 million a month. See: Agence Europe (2014), “JHA: 
Triton introduced and Mare Nostrum withdrawn”, Brussels, 31 October. 
12 Interview at the Commission, DG Home Affairs. 
13 See for an overview of some of this funding amounting to €50 million: European Commission (2014), Staff working 
document – Implementation of the Commission on the work of the Task Force Mediterranean, Part 2/2, SWD(2014) 173 
final, Brussels, 22 May, p. 40. 
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The operational area stretched far beyond Italian territorial waters and contiguous zones, overlapping with the 
Maltese and Libyan SAR zones,14 and a large number of assets participated in the operation, such as naval 
vessels, airplanes, drones and helicopters.15 The main actor driving the operation was the Italian Navy under 
the ministry of defence, with more than 900 personnel dedicated to the operation.16 Naval vessels indeed took 
a leading role in the interception activities of the operation. Echoing similar statements from Italy, Frontex 
former Interim Executive Director Gil Arias explained that a Mare Nostrum type of operation was only 
possible with military ships, due to their capacity to carry a large number of people.17 Interestingly, the 
operation also involved Slovenia, which offered a navy patrol boat with about 40 members for a period of 
some weeks.18  
The Italian Navy reported that by the end of October 2014 150,810 persons19 had been ‘rescued’ by Mare 
Nostrum.20 This means that the Mediterranean migration flows towards Europe in 2014 surpass those following 
the Arab Spring in 2011, when 141,000 persons were detected in the Mediterranean.21 Mr Arias has reported 
that on the Central Mediterranean route, persons are departing mainly from Libya (86%),22 with Eritreans and 
Syrians in the lead (respectively, 23% and 17%) – the latter representing the largest increase for one nationality 
in comparison with 2013.23 According to Mr Arias, most of the incidents at sea (people rescued or intercepted) 
have occurred within the operational area of Mare Nostrum, near the Libyan coast, and not in the operational 
area covered by the ongoing Frontex joint operations (JOs) Hermes and Aeneas (see further section 1.2). He 
concluded that “the number of trips and of persons has drastically increased with the launching of Mare 
Nostrum. I am afraid of saying it is a pull factor, but the smugglers have abused the proximity of this operation 
near to the Libyan coast to put more people in the sea with the assumption that they would be rescued very 
soon. This made it cheaper for them, they put less fuel, less food and less water on the boats which at the same 
time increases the risks of the migrants”.24  
                                                     
14 Amnesty International (2014), “Lives Adrift: Refugees and Migrants in Peril in the Central Mediterranean”, London. 
15 Ibid., footnote 54: according to the same Amnesty International report, “The Italian Navy assets available to OMN 
include: one amphibious ship LPD, which has the overall command of the operation, and has on board medical facilities 
and (mezzi da sbarco e gommoni a chiglia rigida); two Maestrale frigates, each with a AB-212 helicopter on board; two 
patrol vessels Costellazioni/Comandanti and Minerva type, which can have on board a AB-212 helicopter; two EH-101 
(MPH) heavy helicopters, on board the amphibious ship, or stationed in Lampedusa/Pantelleria/Catania as required; one 
P180 aircraft, with ForwardLookingInfraRed – FLIR technology, at Pratica di Mare; one LRMP Breguet Atlantic in 
Sigonella; the radar network of the navy which can receive commercial vessels signals (through AutomaticIdentification 
System – AIS technology).” 
16  Italian Defence Ministry (2013), op. cit.  
17 Hearing before the European Parliament’s LIBE Committee on 4 September 2014. 
18 Italian Defence Ministry (2014), “Il Ministro della Difesa Mario Mauro incontra il Primo Ministro Sloveno – la  
Slovenia partecipa all’emergenza immigrazione con una nave in Mare Nostrum”, Comunicato stampa, Nr. 18, 17 January 
(www.marina.difesa.it/documentazione/comunicati/Pagine/2014_018.aspx). 
19 We prefer to use the word “persons” over, e.g. “migrants”, as this is a term referring to them in their most basic capacity 
as human beings, avoiding discussions upfront over whether they are “migrants” or “refugees”. 
20 The Guardian (2014), “Italy: end of ongoing sea rescue mission ‘puts thousands at risk’”, Brussels, 31 October. 
21 Frontex Interim Executive Director Gil Arias during a presentation to the Parliament’s LIBE Committee on 4 September 
2014. This number of arrivals in the context of Mare Nostrum should however be put in context as they constitute only a 
minor share of all entries into the Schengen Area each year (over 16 million short stay Schengen visas issued in 2013, see 
statistics published on website of Commission DG Home (http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-
do/policies/borders-and-visas/visa-policy/docs/synthese_2013_with_filters_en.xls) and of those applying for asylum, e.g. 
435,000 in 2013 (see Eurostat figures: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-QA-14-003/EN/KS-
QA-14-003-EN.PDF).  
22 According to Frontex data: 9% from Egypt, 4% unknown, 0.9% Turkey, 0.4% Tunisia and 0.1% other. See: Presentation 
by Frontex Interim Executive Director Gil Arias during a presentation to the Parliament’s LIBE Committee on 4 
September 2014. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
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The operation’s objective has always been presented as two-sided, namely serving humanitarian and security 
purposes:25 the activities in the operation have included surveillance, SAR, “control procedures on the migrants 
rescued”, the arrest of facilitators and the disembarkation in Italian ports.26 This has resulted in a certain 
blurring of ‘what’ precisely Mare Nostrum is doing. At the same time, however, the official discourse has been 
that the main objective is SAR, and that this can best be implemented by the Navy for its capabilities, i.e. 
fulfilling ‘humanitarian’ purposes with ‘military’ means. This also clearly sets the Mare Nostrum operation 
apart from the EU initiatives in this area, as both SAR and military involvement are exactly the sensitive EU 
competence lines running through this field, as further explained below. Moreover, the ambiguous context in 
which the operation came into existence, unilaterally launched by the Italian Navy without informing EU level 
actors and while the idea of a Frontex operation was still floating around, indicates the authority struggles 
behind choosing from contrasting responses to the deaths at sea. This is not just an EU versus member state 
contrast, but should also be understood in the Italian context where the Navy and other civilian/interior ministry 
actors are engaged in authority struggles.27  
Regarding rule of law challenges, the fact that this was an explicitly SAR-focused and military-driven member 
state operation entails that it is not covered by the EU rule of law frameworks in the area, such as the new 
Frontex sea border surveillance Regulation discussed in section 1.3 below and the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights. Moreover, there have been various reports indicating that the Italian authorities did not engage in the 
necessary procedures to render the EU Dublin Regulation effective, such as fingerprinting,28 thereby allowing 
persons to travel northwards and apply for asylum in another EU member state. This point should not be 
mistaken for an argument in favour of these EU rules and this may be well motivated by the lack of adequate 
reception facilities in Italy, as confirmed by judgments from the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
and a German court.29 It does however signal that also in the follow-up of the Mare Nostrum operation the 
application of EU rule of law frameworks was questionable and that there was a shifting of responsibility for 
the individuals seeking international protection. All this underlines that the choice for establishing the Mare 
Nostrum operation – constituting a specific type of response to the deaths at sea – can be understood in the 
context of authority struggles between national and EU levels which raise a number of rule of law challenges, 
as highlighted in this paragraph and further elaborated upon in section 2 below.  
1.2 ‘Who wants Mare Nostrum?’ and Frontex Triton JO 
The whereabouts and actual future of the Mare Nostrum operation was the object of much discussion at 
national and EU levels during 2014. In Italian politics, the Northern League called for the suspension of the 
operation and the Deputy Senate Speaker, Mr Gasparri from the Forza Italia party, labelled it as an undesirable 
“taxi service”.30 This resonates with a wider argument heard amongst some policy-makers, namely that Mare 
Nostrum has become a ‘pull factor’ for immigration into Europe.31  
The role of the EU Border Agency Frontex (European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation 
at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union) was key in the debates about the future 
of the Mare Nostrum operation. It was founded in 2004 as a former First Pillar Agency and its legal mandate 
                                                     
25 ANSAmed (2013), “Immigration: Italy launches Mare Nostrum, 400 more saved”, Rome, 15 October. 
26 Italian Defence Ministry (2013), op. cit. 
27 As confirmed in several interviews. 
28 P. Fargues and S. Bonfanti (2014), “When the best option is a leaky boat: why migrants risk their lives crossing the 
Mediterranean and what Europe is doing about it”, Migration Policy Centre Policy Brief, No. 5, European University 
Institute, Florence, October, p. 13. 
29 Cf. ECtHR (2014), Grand Chamber Judgment, Application No 29217/12, Tarakhel v. Switzerland, 4 November; 
Frankfurt Administrative Court (2012), Az. 1 L 1994/12.F.A., 11 June.  
30 G. Dinmore and G. Segreti (2014), “Italy’s right calls for end to navy’s rescue of African migrants”, Financial Times, 
22 April.  
31 The UK indicated that it would not further support SAR activities in the Mediterranean as it constitutes a ‘pull factor’, 
see: The Guardian (2014), “UK axes support for Mediterranean migrant rescue operation”, 27 October. 
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was significantly expanded in 2011.32 The agency’s Commission ‘parent DG’ is the DG Home Affairs.33 
Frontex can be seen as a typical EU Home Affairs Agency34 that is emergency- and intelligence-driven and 
responsible for supporting and coordinating operational cooperation between the Schengen national services 
of the participating member states and Schengen Associated Countries. 35 The agency builds upon the Schengen 
acquis and one of its key roles is to implement the Schengen Borders Code at the external borders.36  
Alongside granting the agency a number of new competencies,37 the amended 2011 Frontex Regulation 
reinforced its rule of law framework in a number of ways. It raised the importance of the operational plan to 
be adopted with the host member state before a JO and of the oversight to be exercised by the agency over its 
implementation, including the competence for the Frontex executive director to suspend an operation where 
human rights breaches occur.38 Moreover, the amended Regulation now includes a far greater number of 
references to human rights and refugee law obligations – such as the principle of non-refoulement – and gives 
the agency the task of further developing a Fundamental Rights Strategy and Codes of Conduct.39 The 
obligation was also stipulated to include key European and international maritime, human rights and refugee 
law in the training of border guards and other personnel prior to their participation in operational activities.40 
More human rights monitoring obligations and structures have been set up, although their efficiency has been 
subject to debates and concerns, not least by the European Ombudsman who opened two own-initiative 
investigations into the agency and its safeguarding of human rights obligations.41  
Moreover, the agency’s cooperation with third countries was circumscribed under the 2011 amendments, as 
the new Regulation stipulates that it “shall comply with norms and standards at least equivalent to those set by 
Union legislation also when cooperation with third countries takes place on the territory of those countries”.42 
In concreto, these various provisions make it – in our view – impossible for the agency to once again carry out 
some of its ‘innovative’ JOs in cooperation with third states, such as the HERA JOs that counted on the active 
involvement of Mauritanian and Senegalese officials in intercepting and returning persons.43 These 
                                                     
32 Council (2004), Regulation (EC) 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004 establishing a European Agency for the Management 
of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (Frontex Regulation), 
OJ L349/1, 25 November; Parliament and Council (2011), Regulation (EU) 1168/2011 of 25 October 2011 amending 
Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 establishing a European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation 
at the External Borders of the Member States of the EU (Amended Frontex Regulation), OJ L 304/1, 22 November.  
33 Under the Juncker Commission, these DGs are reshuffled. The new Home Affairs Commissioner Dimitris 
Avramopoulos will now have the portfolio of “Migration and Home Affairs”. 
34 S. Carrera, L. den Hertog and J. Parkin (2013), “The peculiar nature of EU Home Affairs agencies in migration control: 
beyond accountability versus autonomy?”, European Journal of Migration and Law, Volume 15, Issue 4, pp. 337-358. 
35 On the origins of Frontex see also S. Leonard (2009), “The creation of FRONTEX and the politics of institutionalisation 
in the EU External Border Policy”, Journal of Contemporary European Research, Volume 5, Issue 3, pp. 371-388. As to 
how Frontex cannot be seen as an institutionalisation of the post-9/11 securitisation of migration in EU, see A.W. Neal 
(2009), “Securitization and risk at the EU Border: the origins of Frontex”, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 47, 
No. 2, pp. 333-356. 
36 The Court ruling on the UK’s participation in Frontex also confirmed this: CJEU (2007), Case C-77/05, UK v. Council, 
ECR [2007] I-11459.    
37 Most important, the agency was given the competence to process personal data, see: Art. 11c, Parliament and Council 
(2011), op. cit. 
38 Ibid., Arts. 3(1a) and 3a.  
39 Ibid., Art. 26a. 
40 Ibid., Art. 5(a). 
41 European Ombudsman (2013), Draft recommendation of the European Ombudsman in his own-initiative inquiry 
OI/5/2012/BEH-MHC concerning Frontex, Strasbourg, 9 April; European Ombudsman (2014), Fundamental rights and 
forced returns of migrants: Ombudsman opens investigation, Press Release, No. 20, 22 October. 
42 Art. 14, Parliament and Council (2011), op. cit. 
43 See for more detail: S. Carrera (2007), “The EU border management strategy – Frontex and the challenges of irregular 
immigration in the Canary Islands”, CEPS Working Document, No. 261, Brussels, March. 
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amendments can therefore be seen as new rule of law frameworks constraining some of the agency’s 
operational leeway.   
In terms of its operational presence in the Mediterranean, the JO European Patrol Network (EPN) Hermes was 
launched in 2011 as a response to the mobility flows following the Arab Spring and after a formal request by 
Italy.44 Since then, the Hermes JO has been extended several times and has continued its activity into 2014.45 
Italy hosts this Frontex JO with its geographical operational area south of Sicily and among the Pelagic 
Islands.46 Moreover, the agency operated the JO EPN Aeneas since 2011 for several months a year in a 
geographical area covering the coast of Apulia and Calabria, focusing more on the Ionian Sea and also hosted 
by Italy. Taken together, a total of 22 member states are taking part in the Hermes and Aeneas JOs. The number 
of persons intercepted was reduced significantly during the course of 2014 (see table below), which according 
to interviews has been mainly due to the action of the Mare Nostrum operation as it intervenes more to the 
south, thereby intercepting persons before they reach the Frontex JO areas. The authority of Frontex in the area 
had thus decreased significantly as it stood in the shadows of the Mare Nostrum operation. In a Commission 
(DG Home) Communication on the Task Force Mediterranean, and against the implicit background of Italy’s 
Mare Nostrum operation, it attempted to make clear that the role of Frontex should still be central, stating that 
it should be ensured “that reinforced border surveillance operations of Member States are fully coordinated 
with Frontex joint operations”.47  
 
Table 1. EPN Hermes 2013 and 2014 
Operation name 
Total  
Persons 
intercepted 
Total 
persons 
rescued 
Facilitators 
arrested 
EPN Hermes 
2013 
64,647 57,677 204 
EPN Hermes 
2014 
28,953 26,877 76 
Source: Frontex Liaison Office in Brussels, August 2014. 
 
Since the start of the Italian presidency in July 2014, Italy has attempted to find European financial and 
operational support for an ‘exit strategy’ from Mare Nostrum.48 This coincided with a time when member 
states, such as France and Italy, lobbied for increased resources for Frontex, pushing the idea of a ‘Frontex 
Plus’ operation.49 Former Home Affairs Commissioner Malmström, however, tempered the expectations by 
stating in early July, “Frontex is a small agency and cannot take over Mare Nostrum tomorrow”.50 Nonetheless, 
in an official press release published on 28 August 2014, she stated:  
                                                     
44 Frontex (2011), “Hermes 2011 starts tomorrow in Lampedusa”, Warsaw (http://frontex.europa.eu/news/hermes-2011-
starts-tomorrow-in-lampedusa-X4XZcr). 
45 See pledged assets to Hermes in: Frontex (2014), Programme of Work 2014, Warsaw, p. 134. 
46 Frontex (2014), General Report 2013, Warsaw, pp. 59 and 64. 
47 European Commission (2014), op. cit., p. 35. 
48 ANSA (2014), “Alfano seeks Mare Nostrum exit strategy – Interior minister to discuss Mare Nostrum rebus with 
Malmström”, 26 August. See also: ANSA (2014), “Frontex must take place of Mare Nostrum says Gozi – Alfano to meet 
Malmström Wednesday”, 25 August. 
49 EurActiv (2014), “Italy pushes ‘Frontex Plus’ to tackle migration crisis”, 7 July. See also: EurActiv (2014), “France 
campaigns for EU border guards”, 26 June. 
50 Times of Malta (2014), “Malmström: Frontex cannot substitute Italy’s Mare Nostrum operation”, 9 July. 
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“We have decided that the two ongoing Frontex operations Hermes and Aeneas will be merged 
and extended into a new upgraded operation. The aim is to put in place an enlarged ‘Frontex plus’ 
to complement what Italy has been doing.”51 
However, a number of conflicting views were expressed during the press conference as to what exactly this 
EU-led coordinated effort was going to entail and what its relationship would be to the Mare Nostrum 
operation. The Italian minister of the interior made clear that the new Frontex operation would not be “taking 
over” Mare Nostrum. However, in the same press conference Commissioner Malmström stated: 
“The ‘Frontex Plus’ operation will substitute, take over Mare Nostrum, even if it will not be to the 
same extent. ‘Mare Nostrum’ has been very ambitious and we don’t know if we can find the means 
to do exactly what Italy has done…and it has to be within the Frontex mandate.”52  
Several media sources echoed the Commissioner’s statement and announced Frontex was taking over or 
replacing Mare Nostrum.53 Later, however, Commissioner Malmström clarified the Commission’s position 
before the LIBE Committee of the European Parliament and stated that the new Frontex operation would 
actually not take over Mare Nostrum.54 Several Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) asked about the 
lack of clarity on Frontex Plus: How is it exactly going to work and who takes responsibility for SAR now 
carried out in Mare Nostrum?55 Commissioner Malmström stated that the future and continuation of Mare 
Nostrum is a question for the Italian government and that:  
“Frontex does not have the capacity to do Mare Nostrum, not the amount of people, mandate, 
money or the resources. Mare Nostrum is a very expensive operation and Frontex cannot do this 
and the Commission has been very clear – we cannot replace Mare Nostrum…The mandate of 
Frontex is a border guard agency. Now there will be still people coming in the Mediterranean and 
there will be more people coming and this is something we don’t have the solution for.”  
Former Frontex Interim Executive Director Gil Arias also commented before the LIBE Committee, on 4 
September 2014, and responded to MEPs’ reactions alluding to the ‘division of responsibilities’ between Triton 
and Mare Nostrum, concerning the issue of ‘border guarding’ and SAR. Some MEPs indicated that they had 
been mistaken by the declarations that Frontex Plus would be a substitute for Mare Nostrum. Mr Arias stated: 
“‘Frontex Plus’ is totally misleading for the public…The difference between Mare Nostrum and 
Triton is the nature of the two operations, while Mare Nostrum is a SAR operation, Triton will be 
with the main focus on border controls and management, yet frequently the operations coordinated 
by Frontex end in SAR operations.” 
By the end of August 2014, Frontex drafted a “concept document” on the future of the JOs EPN Hermes and 
Aeneas in the Central Mediterranean, which proposed: “JO EPN Hermes 2014 upgraded to new JO EPN Triton 
considering that IT [Italian] national operation Mare Nostrum is terminated”,56 with JO EPN Triton also 
incorporating JO Aeneas. This option was only deemed effective if Mare Nostrum were to be discontinued: as 
the document made clear, “there is an estimation for low operational effectiveness of JO Hermes 2014 as long 
as Mare Nostrum is running (because the latter is covering and intercepting the migratory routes 
                                                     
51 European Commission (2014), Statement by Commissioner Malmström after the meeting with Italian Interior Minister 
Alfano, Brussels, 27 August (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-14-259_en.htm?locale=en). 
52 See: European Commission (2014), Visit of Angelino Alfano, Italian Minister for the Interior and President in office 
of the Council of the EU, to Cecilia Malmström: extracts from the joint press conference, 27 August 
(http://ec.europa.eu/avservices/video/player.cfm?ref=I092071&sitelang=en). 
53 EUobserver (2014), “EU mission to help Italy save boat migrants”, 28 August (http://euobserver.com/news/125377); 
Euronews 2014, “EU ‘Frontex Plus’ agency to replace Italy migrant sea rescue”, 27 August (www.euronews.com/ 
2014/08/27/eu-frontex-plus-agency-to-replace-italy-migrant-sea-rescue).  
54 N. Nielsen (2014), “EU migrant mission will not replace Mare Nostrum”, EUObserver, 3 September 
(http://euobserver.com/justice/125456). 
55 For example, questions by MEP Keller. 
56 Frontex (2014), “Concept of reinforced joint operation tackling the migratory flows towards Italy: JO EPN Triton – to 
better control irregular migration and contribute to SAR in the Mediterranean Sea”, Operations Division – Joint 
Operations Unit, Warsaw, 28 August, p. 10. 
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beforehand)”.57 As shown above, the operational area of Mare Nostrum is further south, close to Libyan 
shores.58 The clear contrast between the two approaches and the implicit condition that Mare Nostrum should 
be discontinued further highlights the authority struggles of the competing operations.  
The Frontex concept document also further underlined the sensitive nature of Frontex getting involved in SAR 
activities. Its title stated that the new Triton operation would “better control irregular migration and contribute 
to SAR in the Mediterranean Sea” and highlighted “early detection as contribution to national MS SAR 
obligations” (emphases added).59 It also stressed that the “Frontex proposed deployment should not be seen as 
limitation for the Host MS to plan and deploy their means to respond to irregular migratory flows in the Central 
Mediterranean as well as to ensure efficient SAR capacity under national responsibility…”60  
One further hurdle that complicated the launching of the Triton JO was the ‘squabbling’ between Italy and 
Malta over the disembarkation of persons, which is a long-standing matter of conflict pertaining to Maltese 
participation in Frontex JOs. The initial 2010 Council Decision on SAR and disembarkation in Frontex sea 
border surveillance operations61 resulted in the unilateral withdrawal of Malta from Frontex JOs, due to its 
opposition to the disembarkation guidelines.62 This step by Malta, and the lengthy and troubled process of 
negotiations and the adoption of these Frontex SAR and disembarkation guidelines/rules (see section 1.3), can 
be understood as a rule of law struggle that influences who can seek what degree of authority over this field. 
It was later reported that in the context of Triton, Malta would be involved “in very exceptional cases, if 
security factors require it”.63  
Eventually, the Triton JO was launched on 1 November 2014 with a monthly operational cost of €2.9 million 
and its operational area being much more limited than that of Mare Nostrum, not stretching beyond the 30 
nautical miles from Italy’s coast lines.64 Following diverging statements about the future of Mare Nostrum, 
indicating differences of opinion of the Italian Navy and defence minister with the prime minister and interior 
minister,65 the operation formally ceased by the end of October 2014, although a two-month transition period 
would reportedly apply and the future of the longstanding Italian naval operation “Constant Vigilance” would 
apparently not be affected.66   
How can we understand these shifting positions on Frontex taking over Mare Nostrum? The major obstacles 
are said to be the limits of the EU’s and Frontex’s mandates and capabilities. As the excerpts from the LIBE 
hearing above show, it is argued that Frontex does not have the mandate to carry out a Mare Nostrum type of 
operation. Although it is acknowledged that situations of distress will arise, the agency says it cannot focus on 
SAR under the rule of law framework applicable to it. Along those lines, the Commission stated that “although 
Frontex is neither a search and rescue body nor does it take up the functions of a Rescue Coordination Centre, 
                                                     
57 Ibid., p. 9. 
58 This is also confirmed by a map of operational areas included in a recent Amnesty International publication, see: 
Amnesty International (2014), op. cit., p. 44.  
59 Frontex (2014), op. cit., pp. 1 and 12. 
60 Ibid., p. 11. 
61 Council (2010), Decision 2010/252/EU of 26 April 2010 supplementing the Schengen Borders Code as regards the 
surveillance of the sea external borders in the context of operational cooperation coordinated by Frontex at the external 
borders of the Member States of the EU, OJ L 111/20, 4 May. 
62 Malta Independent (2010), “Malta to no longer host Frontex missions, PN, PL MEPs trade blows after EP vote”, 26 
March. 
63 Agence Europe (2014), “JHA: Triton introduced and Mare Nostrum withdrawn”, Brussels, 31 October. 
64 N. Nielsen (2014), “Frontex mission to extend just beyond Italian waters”, EUobserver, Brussels, 7 October. The area 
of 30 nautical miles entails that it will not be limited to the territorial waters of Italy or Malta, as the territorial waters 
stretch 12 miles beyond the coast line under the provisions of UNCLOS (United Nations Convention of the Law of the 
Sea), see Art. 3.    
65 The Guardian (2014), “Italian navy says it will continue refugee rescue mission despite plan to scrap it”, 28 October. 
66 The Guardian (2014), “Italy: end of ongoing sea rescue mission ‘puts thousands at risk’”, 31 October. The JHA Council 
conclusions of 10 October 2014 spoke of a “prompt phasing out” of “the emergency measures taken by Italy”, see: Council 
(2014), Conclusions on “taking action to better manage migratory flows”, JHA Council meeting, Luxembourg, 10 
October, pt. II. 
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it assists Member States to fulfil their obligations under international maritime law to render assistance to 
persons in distress.”67 Moreover, although the new Regulation 656/2014 carries the title “rules for the 
surveillance of the external sea borders”68 (emphasis added), it deals with SAR as well (see section 1.3). This 
once more highlights the ambiguity in the mission’s objectives and the sensitivities around the competence of 
SAR, where ‘surveillance’ is the accepted term used to refer to a de facto much wider array of possible 
activities. These dynamics highlight that authority struggles and rule of law challenges interlink: the degree 
and form of authority that can be obtained and publicly claimed is also presented as constrained by the 
applicable rule of law frameworks. 
This series of events is exemplary of how rule of law frameworks, namely legal competencies, mandates and 
rules, can steer the course of debates in EU cooperation regarding border control and surveillance policies in 
the Mediterranean. It typifies the home affairs-driven responses where primarily civilian authorities cooperate 
on border surveillance, and where SAR and military involvement remain sensitive issues. It highlights the 
importance accorded in the EU home affairs field of professionals to ‘who’ does ‘what’ ‘where’, thereby also 
excluding other actors – chiefly the military – in the process. Rule of law frameworks can thereby also be used 
as a forceful argument to refrain from taking action.  
As the Mare Nostrum Operation became increasingly perceived as a ‘pull factor’ in national and EU policy-
making circles, it seemed that the continuation of such a SAR-heavy operation became ‘unwanted’. The 
argument that a European response is unable to provide such an operation due to limited mandates and 
competences could also be understood as an attempt – by Italy and the Commission and Frontex – to hide a 
more political choice of not wanting to continue Mare Nostrum in any case. As highlighted above, the official 
argument advanced was that a limited Frontex JO was “the only possible response” under the EU rule of law 
frameworks in place, although its “effectiveness” was in turn said to require the discontinuation of Mare 
Nostrum. One could understand this as a way to employ rule of law arguments to win authority struggles. The 
reluctance to launch a JO with a SAR focus and beyond the territorial waters of EU member states could be 
understood as a way to evade constraints from the new Regulation 656/2014 covering those Frontex maritime 
operations. This Regulation now more clearly circumscribes central issues such as ‘what’ constitutes a place 
of safety and establishing procedures for SAR and disembarkation, thereby also raising the prospects for 
liability where incidents might occur at sea.  
1.3 The Regulation on Frontex sea border surveillance operations 
In the background of the developments described above, there was a long and troubled process of negotiating 
and challenging the rules applicable to Frontex sea border surveillance operations. Frontex JOs are now 
covered by Regulation 656/2014 adopted in May 2014, which outlines common rules on the interception of 
ships at sea, including on the high seas, and on SAR and disembarkation.69 These rules replace a 2010 Council 
Decision70 that contained guidelines on SAR and disembarkation but that was annulled by the CJEU in 2012 
after being challenged by the European Parliament (see more in detail below).71 The new Regulation contains 
a legal framework that regulates and hence circumscribes the way in which border surveillance, SAR and 
disembarkation are to be carried out in the context of Frontex operations. Moreover, it includes an annual 
reporting mechanism to the Parliament that should include “any incidents which may have taken place”.72  
                                                     
67 Commission (2014), “Frontex Joint Operation ‘Triton’ – Concerted efforts to manage migration in the Central 
Mediterranean”, MEMO, Brussels, 7 October. 
68 Parliament and Council (2014), Regulation (EU) No 656/2014 of 15 May 2014 establishing rules for the surveillance 
of the external sea borders in the context of operational cooperation coordinated by Frontex at the external borders of the 
Member States of the EU (Regulation on Frontex sea border surveillance operations), OJ L 189/93, 27 June. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Council (2010), op. cit. 
71 CJEU (2012), Case C-355/10, Parliament v Council. 
72 Art. 13(2), Parliament and Council (2014), Regulation on Frontex sea border surveillance operations, op. cit. 
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Merging with another rule of law struggle by Italy, the new Regulation also aims to codify the landmark Hirsi 
v. Italy judgment by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).73 In that case, the ECtHR found Italian 
push-backs to Libya in violation of Articles 3 (non-refoulement) and 13 (effective remedy) of the Convention 
and of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 to it (prohibition of collective expulsion).74 This new Regulation includes 
some red lines and, judging from the fierce member state and inter-institutional struggles, constrains the 
operational leeway in Frontex maritime operations. However, it should be stressed that rule of law challenges 
remain, such as, inter alia, relating to the insufficient availability of interpreters and legal advisers at sea.75  
Another problematic issue concerns the role of third-state Rescue Coordination Centres (RCCs) in identifying 
a place of safety in SAR situations under Article 10(c) of the Regulation. Although other provisions in the 
Regulation aim to anticipate the possible non-functioning of these third-state RCCs and the rule of law 
challenges stemming from operations taking place on the territorial sea of third countries,76 the baseline 
remains that the responsible RCC – including those of a third state – can designate a place of safety. It is 
important here to echo the observations of Rapporteur Tineke Strik, who investigated the case of the so-called 
‘left-to-die-boat’ for the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly.77 She highlighted the importance for 
states to start coordinating SAR activities immediately, as every second counts, irrespective of the SAR area 
from which the distress is sent, until it can be transferred safely to the responsible SAR authority.78 Article 
10(c) of the Regulations should thus not be interpreted by member states to denounce responsibility for distress 
situations from other SAR areas, such as from the mostly dysfunctional Libyan SAR area.  
Moreover, as the rules for interception only cover the member states’ territorial seas and the high seas,79 the 
responsibility for situations where Frontex operations would de facto deter boats from the territorial seas of 
third states remains uncodified. One can recall here the Frontex HERA JO off the West African coast, where 
boats were prevented from leaving through cooperation with third-state authorities.80 In our opinion, since 
Article 14(1) of the 2011 amended Frontex Regulation and Recital 5 of the Regulation on Frontex sea border 
surveillance operations now clearly stipulate the respect for Union law even if cooperation takes place in third-
state territorial waters,81 these kinds of practices will now trigger the responsibility of Frontex for possible 
                                                     
73 Ibid., Art. 4. 
74 ECtHR (2012), Grand Chamber Judgment, Application No 27765/09, Hirsi Jamaa and others v. Italy, 23.02.2012. 
75 The Meijers Committee pointed out that the Commission proposal does not codify the Hirsi v. Italy judgment by the 
ECtHR as regards the requirement that effective remedies should be in place, including interpreters, advisers and a 
suspensive effect of the remedy, see: Meijers Committee (2013), “Note on the Proposal for a Regulation establishing 
rules for the surveillance of the external sea borders in the context of operational cooperation coordinated by Frontex”, 
25 May, pp. 2-3. After the Parliament and Council negotiations, the adopted Regulation now formulates that interpreters 
and legal advisers may be based on shore, but that these matters can be detailed in the operational plan (see Article 4(3), 
Parliament and Council (2014), Regulation on Frontex sea border surveillance operations, op. cit.). See also: Amnesty 
International, International Commission of Jurists and the European Council on Refugees and Exiles (2013), “Joint 
Briefing on the European Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
establishing rules for the surveillance of the external sea borders in the context of operational cooperation coordinated by 
Frontex”, 6 September.  
76 Art. 9(2.i), Parliament and Council (2014), Regulation on Frontex sea border surveillance operations, op. cit., foresees 
a situation where “the Rescue Coordination Centre of a third country responsible for the search and rescue region does 
not respond to the information transmitted”. In such a situation, another Rescue Coordination Centre should take over.  
77 T. Strik (2012), “Lives lost in the Mediterranean Sea: Who is responsible?”, Report for the Parliamentary 
Assembly, Committee on Migration, Refugees and Displaced Persons, Council of Europe, 29 March. 
78 T. Strik (2014), “The ‘left-to-die boat’: actions and reactions”, Report for the Parliamentary 
Assembly, Committee on Migration, Refugees and Displaced Persons, Council of Europe, 9 June, pp. 9-10.  
79 See Arts. 6 and 7, Parliament and Council (2014), Regulation on Frontex sea border surveillance operations, op. cit. 
80 See for more detail: Carrera (2007), op. cit. 
81 Recital 5 of the Regulation states that “when cooperation with third countries takes place on the territory or the territorial 
sea of those countries, the Member States and the Agency should comply with norms and standards at least equivalent to 
those set by Union law”. This echoes a similar provision in Art. 14, Parliament and Council (2011), Amended Frontex 
Regulation, op. cit. 
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incidents and human rights violations. This is in line with the argument advanced in this paper that Frontex 
has gradually become embedded in a rule of law framework (see below section 2.1 and 3).  
Rule of law challenges also emerged in the negotiation process of Regulation 656/2014. Six member states 
with Mediterranean sea borders (Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Cyprus and Malta) argued that the “regulation 
of search and rescue and disembarkation in an EU legislative instrument is unacceptable” and “constitutes a 
red line”.82 They opposed Articles 9 and 10 of the Regulation pertaining to the specifics of SAR and 
disembarkation. These member states clearly indicated that this remains a member state exclusive competence 
that is regulated by international law.83 It is interesting to note that while these six member states were trying 
to resist EU level rule of law frameworks pertaining to SAR and disembarkation, Italy was engaging in its 
national and – so it claimed – SAR-focused Mare Nostrum Operation. These member states argued that these 
matters should be exclusively laid down in the operational plans for Frontex JOs, now that this is considered 
a legally binding document and regulated in Article 3a(j) of the 2011 amended Frontex Regulation. They 
argued that there should not be a specific list of definitions and obligations in the Regulation.84  
The crucial turning point in the easing of member states’ concerns about the Regulation was the reassurance 
that Articles 9 and 10 would unequivocally only apply to Frontex operations by explicitly indicating that they 
pertain to the operational plan of each Frontex JO. This was done by introducing a ‘chapeau’ provision to these 
Articles, respectively in Articles 9(2) and 10(1) stipulating that “the operational plan shall contain…at least” 
the listed provisions there. Although this limited scope of the SAR and disembarkation rules could already be 
logically deduced from the overall scope of the proposed Regulation, namely referring to surveillance “in the 
context of operational cooperation coordinated” by Frontex, this reassured the opposing member states that 
the formulated requirements relate exclusively to Frontex operations. Although member states had to 
eventually accept that the Regulation contains the codification of SAR and disembarkation obligations at EU 
level, they made sure that it does not create obligations and responsibilities for their national operations, such 
as Italy’s Mare Nostrum.      
The opposition of the member states to an EU rule of law framework covering SAR can also be understood 
against the background of the long-standing discussions over the extent to which the concept of ‘border 
surveillance’ also subsumes SAR obligations. Although SAR is indeed not a formally accepted EU competence 
and the official activity covered by the Regulation is ‘border surveillance’,85 it certainly enters the area of SAR 
and provides rules applicable to SAR and disembarkation. This is also clear from Recital 1 of the Regulation 
which states:  
“border surveillance is not limited to the detection of attempts at unauthorised border crossings 
but equally extends to steps such as intercepting vessels suspected of trying to gain entry to the 
Union without submitting to border checks, as well as arrangements intended to address situations 
such as search and rescue that may arise during a border surveillance operation at sea and 
arrangements intended to bring such an operation to a successful conclusion” (emphasis added).86  
In the above-mentioned CJEU case (C-355/10) on the initial 2010 Council Decision, the Court examined the 
meaning and scope of ‘border surveillance’ and the extent to which this EU concept covered issues related to 
SAR and disembarkation. The Court did this to ascertain whether the contested Decision introduced new 
essential elements in the SBC and should therefore be subject to the Ordinary Legislative Procedure and not 
to delegated acts. One of the arguments put forward by the European Parliament was that the Decision 
introduced new essential elements in the concept of ‘border surveillance’ envisaged in the SBC. The 
Parliament argued that rules relating to activities such as SAR and disembarkation do not fall within the 
                                                     
82 Council (2013), Doc. 14612/13, Brussels, 10 October, p. 1. 
83 Ibid. See for a highly critical assessment of this position taken by these six member states: S. Peers, “EU rules on 
maritime rescue: Member States quibble while migrants drown”, Statewatch Analysis, 22 October. 
84 Council (2013), op. cit., p. 3. 
85 Art. 2(2), Parliament and Council (2014), Regulation on Frontex sea border surveillance operations, op. cit. 
86 A similar statement is made in Recital 14, which reads, “During a border surveillance operation at sea, a situation may 
occur where it will be necessary to render assistance to persons found in distress”.  
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concept of surveillance.87 The Council contended that the guidelines were not contrary to the policy aims of 
border surveillance and that they were primarily intended to facilitate the running of the operations.88 In the 
Council’s view: 
“Admittedly, helping ships in distress is not a surveillance measure in the narrow sense. However, 
if such a situation were to occur during a surveillance operation coordinated by the Agency, it 
would be indispensable to coordinate in advance how the search and rescue was conducted by 
various participating Member States. In those circumstances, the Council takes the view that the 
contested decision does not introduce new elements into the SBC.”89 
Similarly, the Commission contended that the Decision did not introduce ‘new elements’ into the SBC because:  
“In order to assess whether ‘search and rescue’ falls within the concept of surveillance, it is 
important to take into consideration the factual circumstances in which attempted illegal entries 
arise. In many instances, the surveillance operation will prompt the search and rescue situation, 
and it is not possible to draw a sharp distinction between those operations.”90 
The CJEU answer to this struggle over delimitating border surveillance was that “it entails political choices 
falling within the responsibilities of the European Union legislature, in that it requires the conflicting interests 
at issue to be weighed up on the basis of a number of assessments.” Depending on these political choices, the 
powers of the border guards may vary significantly.91 Also, the CJEU clarified that the kind of powers 
conferred to border guards and covered by the contested Decision meant that “the fundamental rights of the 
persons concerned may be interfered with to such an extent that the involvement of the European Union 
legislature is required.”92 Political choices were considered to be essential behind the dispute, according to the 
Court, and they could only be settled through the involvement of the EU legislature. The Court then concluded 
that the contested Decision contained essential elements of external maritime border surveillance and should 
therefore by adopted by a legislative act.93  
This case before the Court is central in understanding how rule of law challenges and authority struggles are 
intertwined in this field. Certainly, there was prima facie a legal dispute over institutional prerogatives. Yet 
the essential dispute related to who has the authority to shape the content and scope of the rule of law 
frameworks covering this field. The member states pushed for the adoption of a narrow set of guidelines on 
SAR and disembarkation exclusively in the scope of Frontex JOs. The CJEU judgment eventually resulted in 
the full involvement of the Union legislature for adopting a new Regulation. Member states could accept these 
rules under the sole condition that this new EU rule of law framework would not cover their national activities 
in this field, and hence not create additional obligations, responsibilities and liabilities. The case of Italy is 
most telling in this regard, as it was the staunchest opponent of binding EU rules on SAR and disembarkation 
whereas at the same time implementing a significant national operation claiming to do exactly that and which 
strongly decreased the authority of the Frontex operations also ongoing in the Central Mediterranean. It shows 
that member states attempted to seek authority in this field outside the scope of EU rule of law frameworks.  
                                                     
87 CJEU (2012), op. cit., para. 50. 
88 Ibid., para. 53. 
89 Ibid., para. 54. 
90 Ibid., para. 56. The CJEU held in paragraph 84: “In those circumstances, the contested decision must be annulled in its 
entirety because it contains essential elements of the surveillance of the sea external borders of the Member States which 
go beyond the scope of the additional measures within the meaning of Article 12(5) of the SBC, and only the European 
Union legislature was entitled to adopt such a decision.” 
91 Ibid., para. 76: The CJEU held: “Depending on the political choices on the basis of which those rules are adopted, the 
powers of the border guards may vary significantly, and the exercise of those powers require authorisation, be an 
obligation or be prohibited, for example, in relation to applying enforcement measures, using force or conducting the 
persons apprehended to a specific location. In addition, where those powers concern the taking of measures against ships, 
their exercise is liable, depending on the scope of the powers, to interfere with the sovereign rights of third countries 
according to the flag flown by the ships concerned. Thus, the adoption of such rules constitutes a major development in 
the SBC system.” 
92 Ibid., para. 77. 
93 Ibid., para. 79.  
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1.4 The EU Maritime Security Strategy: Whose strategy? 
Another far-reaching policy development in this domain has been the emergence of the EU Maritime Security 
Strategy (MSS), which pertains to maritime surveillance in a number of ways. The MSS was adopted by the 
Council in June 2014 but is the result of a longer process at play in which the defence, foreign affairs and 
maritime affairs policy communities played a major role. This process was shaped by, inter alia, the Integrated 
Maritime Policy (IMP) adopted in 2007,94 several (Foreign Affairs and General Affairs) Council and European 
Council Conclusions95 and a Commission (DG Maritime Affairs) Communication on integrated maritime 
surveillance,96 as well as by a ‘Wise Pen’ report on maritime surveillance for the EDA.97 Prepared by the 
Political and Security Committee (PSC) within the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) structures, 
the Council Conclusions of April 2010 called upon the High Representative, “together with the Commission 
and the Member States”, to prepare “options for the possible elaboration of a Security Strategy for the global 
maritime domain”.98 The talks over the MSS were subsequently taken forward in the Council’s FoP Group.    
The MSS as now adopted clearly deals with migration flows as one of the relevant “risks and threats”, where 
it lists “trafficking of human beings and smuggling of migrants, organised criminal networks facilitating illegal 
migration”.99 Moreover, the MSS aims to “help secure the Union’s maritime external borders”.100 The 
increased “maritime awareness, surveillance and information sharing” is one of its central pillars to deal with 
these “risks and threats”, with “the objective to ensure that maritime surveillance information collected by one 
maritime civilian or military authority…can be shared and subject to multiuse”.101 In terms of its approach, the 
MSS indeed follows a dominant “cross-sectoral” approach that promotes “multipurpose”, “dual-use” and 
“civil-military” forms of activities.102 This also entails the further integration of civilian and military actors 
and assets, and should more specifically be understood as more cooperation between the navies and coast 
guards. As the former EU Commissioner for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries recently stated in a speech on the 
MSS:  
“And when I refer to ‘national’ capabilities, I mean both military and civilian. This is an essential 
point. All these capabilities, civilian and military, form an integral part of the overall security set-
up and I see no reason for rivalry or antagonism. I hope we can agree on this premise.”103  
Although the implementation of the MSS is to be awaited, it promotes a discourse in which migratory flows 
are perceived as a source of risk that needs a partially military response. However, here again we can see the 
competence struggles dominating the field: the MSS explicitly indicates that it “does not affect the respective 
competences of the Union and its Member States” and that “new structures, legislation, additional 
administrative burden” should be avoided.104 That is also why the MSS and its Action Plan are formally non-
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binding documents. The adoption of these documents can be seen as a strategy to drive the EU debate over 
incorporating the navies more in border surveillance, including the surveillance of mobility.  
The MSS Action Plan has been negotiated in the Council’s FoP Group and was adopted on 16 December 2014 
by the General Affairs Council.105 The Italian government saw the adoption of this Action Plan as one of the 
priorities for its presidency and seems to have steered the discussions towards more attention for surveillance, 
also including SAR.106 The “implementation and review” of the Action Plan will also be coordinated by the 
FoP.107 
To understand better the authority struggles and rule of law challenges at play here, it is crucial to take a look 
at the institutional dynamics behind the MSS and its Action Plan. The FoP, the body chosen for negotiations, 
can be understood as an ad hoc, informal and cross-sector Council working group of member states and EU 
representatives that does not fall under any of the sector-specific Council configurations, such as those relating 
to JHA or Foreign Affairs. Rather, it prepares the adoption and then forwards the files to Coreper, in turn 
feeding it through to the General Affairs Council. The FoP is closely, though not exclusively, linked to the 
specific set of actors related to the maritime domain, as it was reportedly first used for the adoption of the 
Integrated Maritime Policy in 2007. It has also been used to prepare the adoption of a legislative act: the 
Maritime Spatial Planning Directive.108  
We gathered from interviews that DG Mare usually does the talking for the Commission, although the 
Commission delegation also varies to include representatives from DGs Move (Mobility and Transport), 
Enterprise (and Industry), ECHO (Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection) and Home Affairs.109 Moreover, for 
the technical details of setting up the CISE network, DGs Connect (Communications Networks, Content and 
Technology) and Digit (Informatics) are also in contact with DG Mare, the last leading the file more on the 
political level. Furthermore, the EDA is represented in the FoP directly, whereas other agencies are represented 
through their parent DGs. Most of the member states are represented, but not always all of them as some show 
more interest than others in maritime affairs. The member state delegations are mostly of a defence (navy) and 
foreign affairs nature. With Greece and then Italy holding the Council presidencies in 2014, the MSS and its 
Action Plan received serious political priority, also including – against the backdrop of the migration flows in 
the Mediterranean – the issues of border surveillance, control and SAR. The FoP functions along these lines: 
the presidency sets the agenda, with support from the Directorate General Policy of the Council Secretariat.110 
It should however be stressed that we also experienced during our research that the information regarding the 
proceedings of FoP and the specific ministries and EU actors involved in specific meetings is far from 
transparent. This concerns a key rule of law challenge, namely that there appears to be a transparency and 
accountability deficit as to what the FoP is actually doing and with which ‘friends’.  
Although the MSS itself is not directly backed up with funding, because of its dominant cross-sectoral 
approach its Action Plan foresees attracting funding from an array of sources, such as Horizon 2020 and EDA 
research funding as well as from external relations funds and European Structural and Investments Funds.111 
If these sources could indeed be mobilised, this would present a funding potential clearly surpassing the mere 
home affairs-driven funding. Exploring the linkages between funding for civilian and military EU activities 
was also recently recommended to the Council’s Political and Security Committee.112 One of the central 
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strategies in that regard is to use ‘dual funding for dual use projects’,113 meaning, e.g. Horizon 2020 funds, 
which can only fund research for civilian applications,114 will be used in combination with other military-
related funds to finance projects that can have uses both in the civilian and military domains, i.e. dual use. 
However, we question this strategy and understand it as an attempt to evade and conflate the rule of law 
frameworks governing the EU funds.     
If the MSS would indeed be able to bring together in the implementation phase all the actors involved, 
including the military, then this would potentially mean a serious reversal of a thus far home affairs-driven 
approach to the maritime surveillance of mobility. This means that there are alternative or parallel fields of 
actors proposing competing approaches in this area: on the one hand, the home affairs and Schengen 
cooperation between primarily civilian actors (border guards) and increasingly based on legal mandates, 
competences and rules; and, on the other hand, the defence, foreign and maritime affairs professionals 
encouraging ‘cross-sectoral’ and ‘civil-military’ cooperation, presenting experimental ways of working 
outside rule of law frameworks. Although the MSS Action Plan speaks of “the respect for rules and principles”, 
“rules-based governance” and “rule of law”, this seems to be equated mostly with “criminal justice and 
maritime law enforcement”, thus presenting a narrow understanding of the rule of law.115 This shows that the 
seeking of authority outside EU rule of law frameworks is not only a struggle mounted by member states in 
initiatives such as the Mare Nostrum operation, but also by EU-level actors pursuing initiatives outside the 
increasingly formalised and institutionalised home affairs and Schengen cooperation on border controls and 
surveillance and the Lisbon Treaty rule of law frameworks. 
1.5 The surveillance race towards the ‘system of the systems’: EUROSUR, 
MARSUR and CISE 
The most visible and concrete example of struggles for authority and actor competition in the field of European 
surveillance of maritime mobility is over which surveillance system will manage to become the true and 
definitive ‘system of the systems’. EU policy-making communities are working on their own and parallel 
surveillance systems, thus clearly opening the space for competition. There seems to be an exponential growth 
of EU (pilot and research) projects and systems focusing on maritime surveillance and information exchange 
technologies.116 The European Council stressed in its 2011 Conclusions on the integration of maritime 
surveillance:  
“The importance of coordination, at EU and national level, in order to promote coherence and 
compatibility and to maintain overview and transparency in the many potentially interrelated 
initiatives and developments at Union level”. 
For reasons of limited space, this section limits itself to brief discussions of the main systems and the struggles 
between them, namely the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR), the Maritime Surveillance 
System (MARSUR) and the Common Information Sharing Environment (CISE). Although not the focus of 
                                                     
113 As confirmed during interviews. 
114 Art. 19(2), Parliament and Council (2013), Regulation (EU) 1291/2013 of 11 December 2013 establishing Horizon 
2020 – the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation (2014-2020) and repealing Decision No. 1982/2006/EC, 
OJ L 347/104, 20 December. 
115 Council (2014), EUMSS Action Plan, op. cit., pp. 2, 3 and 5. 
116 An overview of a plethora of different systems and pilot/research projects with names such as “BleuMassMed” and 
“FLUX” is given throughout the recent Commission communication on CISE, see: Commission (2014), Better situational 
awareness by enhance cooperation across maritime surveillance authorities: next steps within the Common Information 
Sharing Environment for the EU maritime domain, COM(2014) 451 final. In addition to the many initiatives mentioned 
there, the “Seahorse network” could also mentioned, in which Libya is also foreseen to participate, as well as the “Close 
Eye” project, see: Commission (2014), Implementation of the Commission on the work of the Task Force Mediterranean, 
op. cit., pp. 9, 23, 39.  
WHOSE MARE?  17 
this paper, it should be noted at the outset that the involvement of private security companies constitutes a 
crucial driver behind the development of these systems.117 
In the crucial month of October 2013, with the Lampedusa tragedy fresh in memory, the Parliament and 
Council adopted the EUROSUR Regulation after a lengthy process of negotiation.118 The Regulation entered 
into force in December 2013 for the 19 member states with external borders to the east and the south, with the 
remaining member states joining in December 2014. EUROSUR is a European border surveillance network, 
consistently presented as the ‘system of the systems’,119 that aims to draw together information from an array 
of sources, thereby providing a “near-real time” situational picture of the EU external land and sea borders and 
of “pre-frontier” areas. This should raise “situational awareness” and “reaction capability”.120  
The information is fed into the system via a network of hubs and nodes. Frontex leads the implementation of 
EUROSUR and is itself also a node, bringing together information into a “European situational picture” and 
“common pre-frontier intelligence picture”.121 The most important interlocutors for the agency in feeding 
information into the system are the National Coordination Centres (NCCs) established by the member states. 
Moreover, information from several EU agencies (e.g. Europol, the EU Satellite Centre, the European 
Maritime Safety Agency and the European Asylum Support Office), the EEAS, international organisations and 
third countries is supposed to be entered into EUROSUR. So far, the NCCs are represented by different entities 
depending on the member state involved, including border guards, (border) police, national guards, the prime 
minister’s office, the interior ministry, the armed forces and the coast guard.122 The NCCs also cooperate with 
the respective Maritime Rescue Coordination Centres (MRCCs), with some member states also co-locating 
the NCC and the MRCC. Although SAR is formally excluded from the Regulation, this suggests indeed that 
there could be follow-up of EUROSUR information by the competent SAR authorities. Although former 
Frontex Interim Executive Director Gil Arias downplayed the potential of EUROSUR for SAR purposes,123 a 
recent report indicated at least one such SAR follow-up.124    
EUROSUR is “multipurpose”,125 aiming at “detecting, preventing and combating illegal immigration and 
cross-border crime and contributing to ensuring the protection and saving lives of migrants”.126 The purpose 
of saving migrant lives has been a prominent argument in the adoption of the Regulation, and human rights 
provisions – in particular relating to non-refoulement, human dignity and data protection – are also entered 
into the Regulation.127 
In line with its ‘system of the systems’ ambitions, EUROSUR is presented by the main actors behind it – 
Commission DG Home and Frontex – as the preferred way of surveillance and exchange. This is a way to gain 
more authority, also over the non-home affairs actors engaging in maritime surveillance. For example, the 
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Commission (DG Home) recently attempted to do so in the Mediterranean context by stating that “national 
[border surveillance] efforts – regardless of the authority undertaking them – should be shared through the 
EUROSUR network” (emphasis added).128 This encourages non-home affairs actors, especially those of a 
military nature, to also channel their information through the home affairs EUROSUR, as an attempt to gain 
more information authority. Regarding this military input, the Commission went on to say that this “should be 
encouraged within the overall legal framework of Frontex and EUROSUR Regulations which would apply to 
participating military assets”.129 Moreover, the Commission stated that “the possible involvement of countries 
of departure in maritime surveillance operations should be discussed, within the Frontex and EUROSUR legal 
framework”.130  
Around the same time that EUROSUR became operational under Frontex leadership, the EDA announced that 
the MARSUR system reached “operational status”.131 This is arguably the most important project for the EDA, 
as it was its first project after its establishment in 2005.132 The objectives of this navy-built network are “to 
avoid duplication of effort and the use of available technologies, data and information; to enhance cooperation 
in a simple, efficient and low-cost solution for civil-military cooperation; and to support safety and security”.133 
In essence, this is a naval information exchange system. The combined data would bring about a “Recognised 
Maritime Picture”. The participation of member states is “voluntary”, with currently 17 member states and 
Norway participating and open to “third party input such as data from friendly regional states or military 
partners”.134 The emphasis of the system is on ‘networking’ on a voluntary basis between naval ‘friends’ on 
the basis of built trust, also coined the ‘Facebook’ approach to information sharing in the maritime surveillance 
field.135 The system has a clear military nature and is thus set up without involvement of the Union legislature 
and outside Union rule of law frameworks. MARSUR was also presented as a “system of the systems” in its 
own right and is since the end of October 2014 – after the EDA-led preparatory phase – in its ‘live phase’ and 
has been handed over to the EU Military Staff within the CSDP structures in the EEAS.136 
Finally, the MSS refers several times to CISE as central to the way forward for the surveillance of the European 
maritime domain. CISE aims to:  
“create a political, organisational and legal environment to enable information sharing across the 
seven relevant sectors/user communities (transport, environmental protection, fisheries control, 
border control, general law enforcement, customs and defence) based on existing and future 
surveillance systems/networks”.137 
The Commission DG Maritime Affairs leads the file in close cooperation with the core actors involved in the 
MSS. It argues that the CISE would be of particular relevance for the surveillance of maritime mobility flows. 
In its latest July 2014 Communication, the Commission highlights that the availability of more “relevant 
information” is crucial: 
“This could potentially lead to the reduction of such threats and risks by 30% on average. Pertinent 
examples would be information sharing between civilian and military authorities on the influx of 
migrants to the Schengen Area through the Mediterranean sea…”138  
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So, whereas EUROSUR and MARSUR attempt to establish themselves as ‘systems of the systems’, they are 
limited to their respective civilian home affairs and military spheres. In contrast to these sector-specific systems 
attempting to gain authority over other sectors, CISE is the result of cross-sectoral thinking, thereby aiming to 
be the true overarching system on maritime surveillance at EU level. Although the MSS Action Plan does 
endorse the sharing of information through EUROSUR and MARSUR, it presents CISE as the true “meta-
project” in the field of “maritime awareness, surveillance and information sharing”.139 In other words: 
EUROSUR and MARSUR will be one of the surveillance systems feeding information into CISE when it 
becomes operational by 2020. This sharing between military and civilian actors is at the very heart of CISE, 
identified as “one of the most important needs”, particularly as regards military input “since military authorities 
are one of the main holders of maritime surveillance data”.140 Although CISE would not create a new source 
of information as such but is all about “interoperability” of existing systems,141 the mere struggles over the 
format in which the information would have to be fed into the system constitutes a matter of defining and 
controlling the flow of information in this area, including the different “impact levels” of incidents, as is for 
example already prevalent in the EUROSUR system.142 This constitutes a clear authority struggle over the 
ownership of information exchange and surveillance technologies in this area, with CISE implicitly but most 
forcefully claiming to be the true and definitive ‘system of the systems’ in the European field of maritime 
surveillance. It must be stressed that MARSUR and CISE should however not be contrasted too much, as the 
actors involved in their development overlap to a high degree. CISE could hence be seen as the next step of 
the MARSUR network. 
However, these authority struggles between surveillance systems and their underlying policy communities also 
bring about rule of law and ethical challenges. The recent Commission Communication on CISE admits that 
“Member State authorities carry out many different operational surveillance tasks, many of them to fulfil 
existing obligations under EU law” which “require specific competences”.143 However, in the MSS and CISE 
logics, this is exactly what is to be overcome as “maritime risks and threats do not respect national or 
administrative borders”.144 Therefore, the Commission “will continue to review existing sectorial legislation 
at EU level in order to remove possible remaining legal barriers to cross-sectoral information sharing while 
ensuring compliance with relevant data protection requirements” (emphasis added).145 At the same time, the 
Commission “does not see a need” to start any cross-sectoral legislative process for the development of CISE 
but rather invites EP and Council to give “political guidance and confirm their willingness to support the 
proposal”.146 Again, this brings to the forefront most forcefully the point made above: that actors are seeking 
authority in this field outside EU rule of law frameworks and supranational legal and scrutiny procedures. Or 
even more: that they are striving to do away with some of the boundaries these rule of law frameworks entail 
and with the legislative processes that formally accompany them.     
2. At a critical junction: Actors inside and outside EU rule of law   
The previous sections have painted the picture of a dynamic field of European surveillance of maritime 
mobility, characterised by authority struggles and rule of law challenges. This section identifies some of the 
cross-cutting processes at play here. This will focus on the policy communities seeking authority over this field 
and on the patterns of doing so inside or outside the EU rule of law frameworks. These struggles essentially 
present us with increasingly diverging processes, both in terms of the policy communities of professionals and 
rule of law frameworks involved. As Bigo has highlighted in his study on the “universes of EU border control: 
military/navy – border guards/police – database analysts”, these communities each have their own 
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‘dispositions’ but share a common interest in “global preventive surveillance”.147 This section aims also at 
providing a better understanding of what has allowed the struggles to come to the forefront so forcefully in 
recent times.  
2.1 Home affairs and Schengen cooperation: Towards formalisation and 
institutionalisation 
The analysis provided in section 1 has first showed that there is a process driven by a home affairs and 
Schengen-based policy-making and operational community of professionals. The Schengen system has indeed 
been one developed and implemented by a very specific set of actors with a predominantly home affairs or 
interior ministry nature. Bigo has demonstrated how since the early 1990s the establishment of Schengen and 
EU free movement was underpinned by a strong discursive component driven by police and security experts, 
who argued that that the abolition of border controls would constitute a major security deficit calling for a 
whole series of “compensatory security measures”.148 However, the initial foundations of the Schengen area 
were in fact mainly driven by economic pressures; the result of an initiative to overcome practical obstacles to 
cross-border trade. The 1985 Schengen Agreement was negotiated largely by ministers of transport and foreign 
affairs, and was primarily concerned with establishing the free circulation of goods, hardly touching upon 
aspects of police and security.149 Guiraudon has argued that since then foreign affairs ministries were ousted 
by justice and home affairs ministries, in particular those of the “interior” in the emergence of 
intergovernmental cooperation on migration control as a new policy venue presenting a flexible, informal, non-
binding and secretive nature of ‘clubs’, which in her opinion has largely justified the security-oriented 
content.150  
The resulting picture has been one where interior ministries and corresponding actors have dominated 
transgovernmental processes of European mobility surveillance. This has meant directly or indirectly 
sidelining foreign affairs actors as well as military, customs, transport and industries professionals and experts. 
The predominance of these specific home affairs communities has materialised in one of the guiding principles 
inspiring the entire Schengen machinery, and which has been highlighted in the Schengen Border Catalogue 
as a ‘best practice’: that the national border authorities should be of a civilian (non-military) nature.151 The 
catalogue, which aims at bringing some clarity to the Schengen acquis, was updated in 2008,152 and states that 
“the competent national authority is a specialized Border Guard or Border Police force (not a military one)”.153 
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In relation to the Frontex Triton JO, it was also stressed that this should be “under full civilian control”.154 
There are a few exceptions, however, as the national authorities in Malta and France show military-related 
components, and Frontex is participating in the CSDP EUBAM Libya.155  
In the home affairs-driven and Schengen-based field, authority struggles have taken place around the principles 
of subsidiarity, solidarity and the actual “division of competences” between the EU and the member states, 
pertaining to the limits of European intervention. Member states are still said to hold sovereignty over their 
borders,156 while at the same time some of these same borders are also common external borders of all the 
participating Schengen states. These struggles have determined the current division of competences and the 
legal definitions of what the EU can do (border controls/surveillance/SAR).  
Although this cooperation initially developed through informal cooperation, the area has become increasingly 
institutionalised and formalised over subsequent Treaty changes, including the Lisbon Treaty. These processes 
have led to the involvement of the Union legislature, CJEU jurisdiction and the applicability of EU rule of law 
frameworks, such as the Charter and a set of harmonised rules and procedures for the crossing of the external 
borders of the EU as laid down in the Schengen Borders Code.157 Moreover, through the amending of its 
founding Regulation in 2011 and the adoption of the Regulation on Frontex sea border surveillance operations 
in 2014, Frontex has also become embedded in a stronger rule of law framework. Of course, it is clear that this 
process has also been accompanied by severe rule of law struggles between the EU and its member states. The 
above described moves by member states in the process of negotiating guidelines and then binding rules for 
SAR and disembarkation for Frontex operations (section 1.3) constitute attempts to resist and evade EU rule 
of law frameworks in this field. Nonetheless, and noting the many shortcomings still found, they constitute 
drivers and constraints for the shape EU interventions can take in this field. 
2.2 Defence, foreign affairs and maritime affairs cooperation: What about EU rule 
of law? 
The processes in this field are, however, at a crossroads, with other policy-making communities at EU and 
member state level also seeking authority. We see new ways of cooperation emerging outside the gradually 
formalised and institutionalised home affairs and Schengen-based cooperation and the broader EU rule of law 
frameworks in place.  
The departure from the home affairs-driven responses can be seen in the launching of the Mare Nostrum 
Operation. In responding to the migratory flows in the Mediterranean and the deaths at sea, the EU home 
affairs ‘solution’ of a Frontex JO did not initially offer a viable option, at least not in the eyes of the Italian 
government that initiated its unilateral and navy-led Mare Nostrum mission, outside EU rule of law 
frameworks. While implementing its own alleged SAR-focused operation, Italy’s position in the negotiations 
over the Frontex sea border surveillance Regulation, also concerning SAR rules, further highlights its 
resistance to such EU rule of law constraints. At the level of EU strategic policy formulation, the MSS is a 
                                                     
154 Council (2014), Note from the Presidency to the Delegations, Taking action to better manage migratory flows, Doc. 
13747/14, Brussels, 6 October, p. 6. 
155 This is the case of the French Gendarmerie Maritime (Ministry of Defence) (www.defense.gouv.fr/marine/ 
organisation/les-forces/gendarmerie-maritime/la-gendarmerie-maritime) and the Armed Forces in Malta, which is under 
the responsibility of the Minister for Home Affairs and National Security. See www.afm.gov.mt/ 
NewsDetails?l=1&nid=2439&cid=82; Commission (2014), Implementation of the Commission on the work of the Task 
Force Mediterranean, op. cit., p. 14. 
156 Art. 77.4 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which reads, “This Article shall not affect the 
competence of the Member States concerning the geographical demarcation of their borders, in accordance with 
international law”. See also recital 4, Parliament and Council (2004), Frontex Regulation, op. cit., which reads, “The 
responsibility for the control and surveillance of external borders lies with the Member States.” 
157 Parliament and Council (2006), Regulation (EC) 562/2006 of 15 March 2006 establishing a Community Code on the 
rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code – SBC), OJ L105/1, 13 April. See also: 
E. Guild (2006), “Danger – Border under construction: Assessing the first five years of Border Policy in an Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice”, in J.W. de Zwaan and F.A.N.J. Goudappel (eds), Freedom, Security and Justice in the 
European Union, Implementation of the Hague Programme, The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, pp. 45-72. 
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clear example of the competing paradigm as well. This strategy – instead of invoking mandates, competences 
and legal rules to determine ‘who’ can do ‘what’ ‘where’ – builds exactly on the opposite: ‘dual-use’ and 
‘civil-military’ approaches are preferred. These approaches do not foster the clear delineation of legal 
competences and mandates but rather attempt to blur and conflate them in order to establish a ‘cross-sectoral’ 
approach, often also outside the formal involvement of the Union legislature.  
As we showed in section 1.4, the MSS and its Action Plan are certainly not home affairs-driven responses but 
were rather shaped in the FoP Group by an alliance of defence, foreign and maritime affairs actors such as the 
EDA, the EEAS and the Commission’s DG MARE. As discussed above, these were exactly those sidelined in 
the home affairs-driven Schengen cooperation. The emergence of this new alliance of professionals can 
therefore also be understood as a way for them to gain back authority in this field. So, although it is clear that 
the initially sidelined policy communities had a ‘motive’ to seek new authority, the question remains why this 
alliance of new actors could emerge at this point.  
In a way, the cross-sectoral approach of the MSS was foreseeable under the Lisbon Treaty with its emphasis 
on synergies between former Treaty-based pillars and legal competences. The Treaty framework under which 
European security cooperation develops has changed since the end of 2009. The entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty remodelled the lines of division between sovereignty-sensitive policy areas and actors in each of them. 
The ownership of policy domains has been liberalised and actors that used to be imprisoned under ‘pillar 
configurations’ have more leeway to engage in new policy venues. This does not only concern the 
disappearance of the former ‘second and third pillars’, but also the establishment of the EEAS in 2010. The 
role of the EEAS, as a sui generis service between the Council and the Commission aiming to bring coherence 
to the EU foreign policy and defence actors and competences, encourages this spirit of cross-sectoral EU 
cooperation. The Lisbon Treaty and its focus on ‘de-pillarisation’ has fostered a certain mindset which could 
unravel what we call the ‘politics of de-pillarisation’. Of course, there are still legal boundaries in place in the 
post-Lisbon era, for example, as regards the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), but the different 
mindset – and especially the emergence of the EEAS – has allowed for new cross-sectoral alliances and 
strategies to emerge.  
Pawlak – in his study on the external dimension of AFSJ – has argued that ‘cross-pillarisation’ cannot just 
foster the coordination of actors and approaches but can also create a situation where a policy field is held 
hostage by the many institutional ‘turf battles’ and ‘internal cross-pillar politics’.158 As boundaries increasingly 
fade away, the space for authority struggles amongst a greater number of actors also widens. A similar 
argument can be applied to our study, namely that the Lisbon Treaty has given larger legitimacy to actors and 
alliances to enter the sphere of maritime border surveillance. This could be understood as a process of post-
Lisbon Treaty ‘politics of de-pillarisation’ of liberalised new alliances and actors which were marginalised 
since the origins of Schengen in the 1990s and which now count on new policy venues to steer their interests 
and agendas.  
Overall, this analysis reveals a field of European surveillance of maritime mobility with ample opportunities 
for authority-seeking strategies between various actors and that is at the same time increasingly marked by the 
rule of law as one of its determining drivers. The reinforced EU rule of law in this field drives not only the 
development that action is covered by it, but also that attempts at evading it are made. The development of the 
MSS, MARSUR and CISE have been driven in the FoP Group by the EDA, Commission DG Mare and the 
EEAS in ways which escape any supranational accountability framework provided by the Treaties. They also 
                                                     
158 This was examined in relation to cross-pillarisation by Pawlak (2009), who examined cross-pillarisation through the 
prism of inter- and intra-institutional politics. Pawlak concluded that “the process towards adoption of the Strategy for 
the External Dimension of JHA serves as the setting for the presentation of intra- and inter-institutional politics resulting 
both from the struggle of power and from ideological differences within and between the EU institutions (Commission, 
Council, European Parliament)” (p. 27). He continues, “In a perfect world, the internal cross-pillarization would 
contribute to the external one in order to build a positive image of the European Union and enhance the effectiveness of 
European policies. However, in reality, external cross-pillarization may become a hostage of internal cross-pillar 
politics…The conflict within and between institutions can stem from their striving for influence within policy areas (turf 
wars), ideological differences over policy approaches and solutions and distribution of scarce resources” (p. 30). P. 
Pawlak (2009), “The external dimension of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: Hijacker or Hostage of Cross-
Pillarization?”, Journal of European Integration, Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 25-44. 
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evade a democratic debate and scrutiny about the ethical and fundamental rights challenges inherent to the 
militarization of border surveillance and management of human mobility in the Mediterranean. Also in the 
negotiations over the Regulation on Frontex sea border operations, it was clear that member states attempted 
to evade EU rule of law frameworks concerning SAR and disembarkation. These developments highlight that 
several actors attempt to work outside EU rules that could allocate responsibility for persons on the move, of 
which many are seeking international protection or at distress at sea.  
3. Conclusions: Whose Mare?  
‘Whose Mare?’ This was the question posed in the introduction of this paper to better understand the latest 
legal, policy and operational developments in maritime border surveillance in the Mediterranean. This paper 
has examined the rule of law challenges inherent to the authority struggles between national and EU security 
professionals behind these developments. Section 1 discussed the Italian Mare Nostrum Operation and the 
debates on its future, including the central role of Frontex therein. This highlighted disputes over the type of 
response to deaths at sea in the Mediterranean and rule of law arguments over limited mandates, competences 
and legal rules. Central to understanding these dynamics was the process through which new binding rules on 
Frontex maritime border surveillance operations became negotiated and adopted by EU member states. This 
process showed clear authority struggles over who was to define the status and scope of such EU level 
involvement in sensitive issues such as SAR and disembarkation. Moreover, it became evident that there was 
significant member state opposition to EU rule of law frameworks in this area. The negotiation behind 
Regulation 656/2014 thus presented itself as the focal point in which authority struggles and rule of law 
challenges interplayed.  
The rule of law frameworks could be understood as drivers or parameters of who gains authority under which 
conditions. Our analysis showed two modes in which rule of law frameworks function as drivers. First, as 
identified in the debates on taking over Mare Nostrum, rule of law frameworks were used discursively to evade 
taking responsibility for the future of the mission and people seeking international protection in the EU 
crossing the Mediterranean Sea. Second, authority has been sought by other security professionals often 
exactly outside these EU rule of law frameworks, by trying to limit their scope of applicability. This move has 
also been evident in the development of the MSS and CISE, in the careful avoidance of questions of applicable 
EU rule of law frameworks such as mandates, competences, legislative procedures and rules determining ‘who’ 
can do ‘what’ ‘where’. The authority struggles emerged most visibly and concretely when looking at the 
competing EU surveillance systems aiming to be the true and definitive ‘system of the systems’ as regards the 
ownership of maritime border surveillance in the Mediterranean. 
Section 2 identified the cross-cutting elements running through these developments, highlighting the actors 
and alliances involved and their relationships with EU rule of law frameworks. It thereby first identified the 
home affairs and Schengen-based cooperation on border controls and surveillance that has become increasingly 
formalised and institutionalised. Crucially also, the Schengen system has been implemented by professionals 
with a predominantly law enforcement, policing and civilian nature. Throughout different Treaty reforms, 
including certainly the Treaty of Lisbon, and linked to the growing involvement of the Union legislature and 
CJEU jurisdiction, the Schengen cooperation has gradually endowed itself with a series of legal standards. 
Although these are still subject to considerable gaps and deficits, in particular in what concerns their 
implementation and monitoring and the accessibility to effective remedies by concerned individuals,159 several 
developments – amongst which also the adoption of the rules for Frontex sea border surveillance operations – 
have gradually brought this toolkit closer to rule of law standards. The Schengen system also depends on a 
fundamental distinction between activities in the rubric of ‘border surveillance’, which fall within the remits 
of the EU competence, and those labelled as SAR and hence presenting more ‘humanitarian’ purposes, which 
remain formally under the sovereignty of national competent authorities of EU member states.  
This paper subsequently highlighted other alliances of actors and approaches entering the scene in a post-
Lisbon Treaty institutional arena. This approach is marked by its attention to ‘cross-sectoral’ and ‘civil-
military’ cooperation, often outside EU rule of law frameworks. The Italian national and Navy-led Mare 
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Nostrum operation can be seen as an instance of this. On the more strategic level, the emergence of the MSS 
shows that indeed these new approaches are now surfacing on the EU level, with alliances of actors from 
primarily the foreign affairs, defence and maritime affairs policy communities. These alliances consist of the 
actors that were initially sidelined by the home affairs communities in the 1990s. Translating the approach of 
‘clubs’ in these early days of home affairs cooperation as highlighted above in section 2.1 to the 21st century, 
this new approach is based on groups of ‘friends’ that engage in ‘networking’ on voluntary and non-binding 
bases, also coined as the ‘Facebook’ approach to informal European cooperation.160 This brings us back to 
some of the ‘experimentalist governance’ strategies and ‘laboratory’ ways of cooperation that we have 
identified before and that so often come at the expense of the rule of law.161 These new actors thus have a clear 
drive to seek new authority in this field, and seem to do so outside EU rule of law frameworks by preferring 
non-binding and informal ways of working. The de-pillarisation by the Lisbon Treaty created a new cross-
pillar drive for ‘synergies’, thereby promoting these ‘cross-sectoral’ initiatives. The establishment of the EEAS 
as a service between the Commission and the Council, with a clear mandate to foster coherence between several 
policy fields, also facilitated that process.  
While some have welcomed the increasing involvement of these actors in maritime surveillance, especially 
focusing on the opportunities of more military involvement in the Mediterranean,162 we see sufficient reason 
to be critical. Although this might be a sign of a more heterogeneous setting of European cooperation, there 
are a number of challenges which share the common concern that several of these actors and initiatives operate 
outside EU rule of law frameworks. Also, as highlighted above, the decision-making procedures in the FoP 
Group show rule of law deficits as regards their lack of accountability. The basic concern is that this hampers 
that action is based on an appropriate legal basis, regulated by a set of clear rules, transparent and open to 
monitoring, thereby enabling legal certainty, effective democratic accountability and judicial review to 
safeguard human rights protection of persons on the move – all of which are central EU rule of law 
principles.163 In essence, this concerns the question of who is responsible for the persons finding themselves 
targeted by these control and surveillance developments, who are often those seeking international protection. 
As demonstrated by Frontex statistics, the top nationalities of the persons intercepted by the Mare Nostrum 
operation were nationals from Eritrea and Syria, which are also the nationalities for which the recognition rates 
for refugee status or subsidiary protection are the highest across the EU.164  
The actors and their non-binding and informal ways of cooperation outside these rule of law frameworks lead 
to a blurring of the interventions and responsibility and hence liability for possible violations of human rights. 
This creates legal uncertainties as regards ‘what’ precisely is being done (border control and surveillance or 
search and rescue at sea?) by ‘whom’ in which capacity. As more actors enter the field, the picture of who 
bears what responsibility for the individuals targeted becomes increasingly fuzzy. Moreover, the growing 
involvement of the military actors – and in particular of the navies – questions their relationship to the 
Schengen legal framework and other established EU rules. It took the home affairs and Schengen-based 
cooperation many years of rule of law challenges and authority struggles before it came to adopt more rule of 
law frameworks. Accepting these actors and approaches risks going back to an era of non-binding, informal 
                                                     
160 As highlighted in our interviews. 
161 J. Pollack and P. Slominski (2009), “Experimentalist but not Accountable Governance? The Role of Frontex in 
Managing the EU’s External Borders”, West European Politics, Vol. 32, No. 5; Carrera, Den Hertog and Parkin (2013), 
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Movement into and within Europe, Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 66-67.  
162 Cf., Parkes (2014), op. cit., Brady (2014), op. cit. and Drent et al. (2013), op. cit.  
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Paper, 04/09, NYU School of Law. 
164 Data as presented by former Frontex Interim Executive Director Gil Arias before the LIBE Committee on 4 September 
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quarterly report – Q3 2014, December (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_ 
quarterly_report). 
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and ‘experimental governance’165 in the field of border surveillance. The new and loose format of actors 
involved in the FoP Group and the ‘soft law’ or policy nature of a document such as the MSS also risk 
sidelining the Union legislature and democratic accountability in this policy-making process. It also evades a 
necessary open and democratic debate about the far-reaching ethical repercussions of the militarization of 
border surveillance and SAR in the Mediterranean. 
This paper showed that a wide range of actors are engaging in rule of law challenges and authority struggles 
in this field. However forceful their arguments from an operational point of view, these actors cannot escape 
the EU rule of law and fundamental rights matrix of supranational legal, democratic and judicial accountability 
which should make no reference to ‘pillars’. Moreover, these issues entail inherent ‘political choices’ having 
an impact on fundamental rights which cannot escape rule of law and require the involvement of the legislature 
and democratic accountability – as the Court has previously concluded.166  
4. Recommendations  
i. More scrutiny by the European Parliament of ongoing operations and decision-making. In the future 
discussions on the border control, surveillance and SAR operations in the Mediterranean, the involvement 
of and scrutiny by the European Parliament is crucial. This reinforced parliamentary scrutiny should focus 
first of all on the ongoing practices in the Frontex Triton JO, thereby paying special attention to its added 
value from a budgetary and rule of law perspective. Second, the Parliament could closely follow the 
implementation of the MSS and the decision-making processes that drive it forward. More precisely, the 
strong role of the FoP Group deserves scrutiny as more transparency concerning its composition and 
discussions is needed. This revolves around the question of who is and who is not a friend of the presidency, 
and the underlying motives.  
ii. Monitoring of rule of law compliance by the European Ombudsman and the Frontex Consultative 
Forum and Fundamental Rights Officer. Also, the implications of the MSS ‘cross-sectoral’ approach 
for the EU rule of law frameworks should be assessed, focussing, e.g. on the growing involvement of 
military actors and the implications for the rights of persons on the move. As regards this latter point, the 
European Ombudsman could play a vital role and could, as in the past,167 continue to scrutinise human 
rights compliance in Frontex JOs. Moreover, the Ombudsman could investigate the lack of transparency 
and accountability of the ways of working in the FoP Group. The Triton JO could be seen as a test case 
for the implementation of the new Regulation on Frontex sea border operations. The Frontex bodies set up 
in 2011 aiming to enhance its human rights compliance – the Consultative Forum and the Fundamental 
Rights Officer – have a special responsibility when it comes to the monitoring of the Triton JO under these 
new rules and under the general rule of law framework now in place. 
iii. A new post to coordinate monitoring: the EU Border Monitor. Going beyond the monitoring of Frontex 
activities, different monitoring activities, including of member state border activities under e.g. national 
or MSS-led implementation, could be coordinated by a new post to be created: that of the EU Border 
Monitor, as recommended earlier.168 It should have the competence “to ensure that EU border controls, 
wherever they take place, are consistent with EU law and the Charter of Fundamental Rights.”169  
iv. A Court of Auditors assessment of the added value and mixing of funding sources. From the budgetary 
angle, the Court of Auditors could assess the added value of the funding deployed for the Frontex Triton 
JO and the implications of the possible mixing of diverse funding instruments for the implementation of 
the ‘cross-sectoral’ MSS and ‘dual use’ funding strategies.  
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v. Drawing up a surveillance-related rule of law strategy by the Commissioner responsible for 
horizontal rule of law (Timmermans). At the highest political level in the Commission, the new 
Commissioner responsible for, inter alia, horizontal rule of law and the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
(Dutch Commissioner Timmermans) could lead the drawing up of an inter-agency rule of law strategy on 
border surveillance, preferably connecting to the Commission’s Roadmap for a Common Approach to EU 
Agencies.170 As he was given the responsibility for “coordinating the Commission’s work related to the 
rule of law”,171 he would also be well placed to monitor rule of law compliance in border surveillance and 
control under the implementation of the MSS that involves several Commission DGs and the EEAS.  
vi. No return to ‘experimentalist governance’ and ‘laboratory’ approaches to policy-making. The 
different monitoring structures should be established and reinforced to make sure that EU approaches to 
border control and surveillance do not retreat to the ‘experimentalist governance’172 that we found in 
previous research on EU Home Affairs Agencies173 and the ‘laboratory’ development of the Schengen 
acquis.174 We could learn from the above-described Europeanization processes that resulted in more 
formalised rule of law frameworks being established. Therefore, we should be careful that the new ‘cross-
sectoral’ approach under the MSS would not start to operate outside that framework.   
vii. The scope of the Regulation on Frontex sea border surveillance operations should be extended. The 
limited scope of the Regulation currently does not cover member state sea border surveillance activities, 
despite the fact that these constitute the majority of European sea border surveillance activities. These 
activities pertain not merely to member state borders, but also have a clear EU dimension as they pertain 
to the external borders of the Schengen area. Therefore, the scope of the Regulation should be extended to 
all sea border surveillance activities by member states, including those falling outside Frontex operational 
cooperation. Moreover, the Regulation should explicitly apply to the interceptions of vessels in third-state 
territorial waters where interceptions are a direct or indirect result of cooperation of Frontex or member 
states with the third state. Last, the possible role of a third-state SAR authority in designating a place of 
safety under Article 10(c) of the Regulation should be explicitly premised on the functioning of that 
authority on a human rights compliant basis.  
viii. More attention to shipmasters’ and fishermen’s obligations to render assistance and de-
criminalising that assistance. Only the true and unhindered engagement of private shipmasters and 
fishermen in search and rescue offers a structural response to deaths at sea.175 In line with a recent report 
by the EU’s Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA),176 the reports by Rapporteur Tineke Strik of the Council 
of Europe177 and our earlier recommendations,178 the Commission should launch a Communication which 
outlines a roadmap towards the full de-criminalisation of the rendering of assistance by private shipmasters 
and fishermen, including proposing the necessary amendments of EU legislation in the area (such as the 
Facilitation Directive) and using its full power to effectuate a change in national legislation where 
                                                     
170 Commission (2012), Commission adopts roadmap for reform of agencies, Brussels, 19 December, 
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necessary. The Task Force Mediterranean also identified the need to “evaluate the current acquis on 
facilitating unauthorised entry” and that there should be issued “a call to shipmasters to remind them of 
their obligations and of the fact that they will not face negative consequences to assist migrants”. It is 
recommended that this issue receives more attention in the work of the Task Force. Also in line with earlier 
recommendations by the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly, a financial compensation 
mechanism should be explored for those rendering assistance, as the economic losses can be prohibitive 
and discourage the rendering of assistance.179 This is especially the case where long waiting periods arise 
from member states’ unwillingness to allow disembarkation.180 To that effect, the proposed extended 
Regulation on sea border surveillance could include a provision stipulating that when member states cause 
unjustified delays in admitting ships for disembarkation, an obligation arises for member states to 
compensate the financially affected shipmasters and fishermen.  
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